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Harmon: Communications Law

COMMUNICATIONS LAW
CABLE TELEVISION: A CHANGING MEDIUM RAISES
NEW LEGAL ISSUES
Richard D. Harmon*
Despite a growing amount of writing on the subject, misunderstandings about the cable television medium persist. Although cable television's first amendment status is now widely
recognized, 1 this status conflicts sharply with ingrained attitudes
about cable television and the propriety of various local governmental controls.
.
The federal courts, including a significant number of district
courts located in the Ninth Circuit, are increasingly being asked
to resolve these conflicts. The Ninth Circuit, however, has not
yet considered the issues raised by cases such as Community
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder.2 Before such consideration occurs, it is appropriate to summarize the issues which are
now emerging in the cable television context.
Although the purpose of this article is to briefly outline certain questions of federal law relevant to cable television in the
1980s, some attempt will also be made to correct misconceptions
* Member, California Bar. Mr. Harmon is a partner with the Oakland, California
law firm of Farrow, Schildhause, Wilson & Rains, and has represented several cablecasters, including the plaintiff in Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455
U.S. 40 (1982).
1. See, e.g., Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370
(10th Cir. 1981) ("Cable operators, like publishers and wireless broadcasters, are entitled
to First Amendment protection." Id. at 1376). Altogether, there are five reported Boulder decisions. Hereinafter they will be referred to as follows: Boulder I (485 F. Supp.
1035 (D. Colo. 1980)) is the first trial court injunction; Boulder II (630 F.2d 704 (lOth
Cir. 1980)) is the 2-1 decision reversing Boulder I; Boulder III (496 F. Supp. 823 (D.
Colo. 1980)) is the second trial court injunction; Boulder IV (660 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir.
1981)) left the second injunction in place, but augmented it, and remanded for a full
trial; Boulder V (455 U.S. 40 (l982)) reversed Boulder II (the first Tenth Circuit
decision).
2. Boulder V, 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
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about cablecasters. 3 There are, of course, differing opinions regarding these factual issues, but an attempt to correct misconceptions is nonetheless warranted, since no analysis of the legal
issues affecting contemporary cable television can ignore the
current factual environment. Some background discussion thus
precedes examination of various legal issues now before those
federal courts in the Ninth Circuit where cable television litigation is pending.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION REGARDING CABLE TELEVISION

A. The Early Years: 1950-1970
Early cable television developed in the 1950s as a means of
filling in service gaps where off-air television signals did not
reach .• Thus, in places where television was otherwise unavailable or reception was poor, an entrepreneur, by erecting an antenna on a high elevation, could gather off-air television signals
and deliver them for a fee to customers by use of a cable, together with simple amplifiers to boost the signals along the
cable. These early cable television systems were literally community antenna television services, or "CATV":' They were almost
always small enterprises, conducted locally, and initially delivered little more than the three national network services which,
it was generally assumed, were principally what viewers wanted.
CATV, to the extent people thought about it at all, was
viewed as a sort of a utility or, at the very least, as a service
which did not have to be duplicated. Occasionally, cable television companies were required to obtain utility-type "franchises"
for a finite term. This response to CATV's "electrical wire" appearance went relatively unchallenged in the industry's infancy,
and thus acquired an aura of legitimacy. Not all cities used a
"franchise" mode, however. Simple non-exclusive permits or licenses were used, often annually renewable, and safe street use
3. Some older authorities only use the term cablecasting in reference to such activities as origination of local programming, but the term is generally being adopted as a
useful reference to anyone who uses cable television facilities to engage in first amend-'
ment dissemination. This would even include retransmitting the programming of another, just as newspapers clearly engage in first amendment activity when they carry
UPI or AP wire stories.
4. M. HAMBURG, ALL ABOUT CABLE 5-6 (1979).
5. Id. Many publications discuss the early years of cable television. See, e.g., CABLE
TELEVISION INFORMATION CENTER, CABLE: AN OVERVIEW 5-11 (1972).
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was insured by generic laws and state regulations controlling aerial construction by "the public utility, with whom [cable television] contracts for poles on which to string its cables.'" Safe
street and utility pole use by cable television was thus insured
by the same laws and regulations.
The tendency of some to regard CATV as essentially a public utility service was questionable even in the 1950s. For example, in a progressive 1956 decision, a unanimous California Supreme Court likened cable television to "music halls, theaters,
and newspapers," and expressly held that cable television is not
a "telephone corporation or within any other class of utility."'7
Some federal courts also realized the non-essential non-utility
status of cable television early on,8 but the issue was in fact
rarely addressed since cable television served only a small percentage of the population and was commonly viewed as merely
an interim service that would slowly disappear as the broadcast
networks filled in most service gaps during the 1950s and 1960s.'
B.

The Middle Years: 1970-1975

Although it became clear during the 1960s that cable television would not be displaced by over-the-air, free broadcast television, development of the medium was still modest,IO and was
severely hampered by the fact that it had little to offer other
than enhancement of broadcast television signals and perhaps
some supplementation of the number of broadcast stations received. l l However, where it did develop in the 1960s, cable television required enough of an investment that commercial financing was needed, and lenders frequently sought greater evidence
of longevity than an annually renewable permit. Accordingly,
6. Boulder 11,630 F.2d at 712; Cable Franchise Investigation: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 582 (1981).
7. Television Transmission v. Public Util. Comm'n, 47 Cal. 2d 82, 88-89 (1956).
8. Greater Fremont, Inc. v. City of Fremont, 302 F. Supp. 652, 644-65 (N.D. Ohio
1968), aff'd sub nom. Wonderland Ventures, Inc. v. City of Sandusky, 423 F.2d 548 (6th
Cir. 1970).
9. See HAMBURG, supra note 4, at 6-7.
10. In 1965, there were only 1,325 operating systems nationwide, with barely over 1
million total subscribers, or less than 0.5 % of the population. CABLE TELEVISION INFORMATION CENTER, CABLE: AN OVERVIEW 9 (1972).
11. However, now-repealed FCC restrictions on importation of distant signals severely hampered the ability of cable television through the 19708 to supplement the
number of stations beyond those available locally.
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franchise contracts were often executed, and came to be unthinkingly accepted as appropriate in the CATV context.
By 1970, it was the rare community that had no free, off-air
television at all, and meaningful development of the cable television medium thus continued to await development of a product
available only via cable television.12 Although some unique services, such as local origination, were in the experimental stages
in the early 1970s, the economic downturn in the early 1970s,
plus a lack of proven consumer demand for any of the experimental services, continued to retard the growth of cable television. 13 Progress was also hampered by restrictive FCC regulations which were adopted in 1972 in a well-intentioned but
controversial effort to improve the media through regulation. As
the Eighth Circuit said in 1978 in striking down one of these
FCC regulations (the mandatory public access rule for cable television), governmental attempts to improve the media offend
the first amendment. 14 The Eighth Circuit stated:
Regulations like those before us, profoundly altering the obligations of a private business, requiring
a fundamental change in its nature, and imposing
costs on its consumer-subscribers, should be
based on more than an uncertain trumpet of expectation alone. In enforcing regulations designed
by the regulator to make futuristic visions come
true, courts must proceed with a care proportional to the risk of delivering thereby into the
regulator'S hands an awesome power. For that
way may lie not just a totally regulated future,
unpalatable as that may be to a free people, but a
government-designed, government-molded, government-packaged future.
The public interest rubric encourages judicial
deference to an agency's expertise, not to its prescience. Findings may be presumptively correct.
Not so futuristic guesses. U
12. See The Role of Congress in Regulating Cable Television and the Potential for
New Technologies in the Communications System: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Communications of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 1090-1091 (1976).
13. Id. at 1085-86.
14. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1045, 1053-56 (8th Cir. 1978), aff'd
sub nom. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
15. 571 F.2d at 1045.
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These comments are even more timely now than they were in
1978.
C.

The Watershed Years: 1975-1976

In the 1975-76 period, a dramatic technical breakthrough
finally enabled cable television to enter urban markets and other
areas receiving good off-air reception. Due to the advent of satellite technology, cable television at last obtained the capability
for the unique programming which it needed to emerge as a significant member of the media and cultivate urban markets. After 1975, program suppliers could use satellites to deliver a wide
variety of programming to local cable television companies. Each
local company would set up its own "earth station" in order to
receive this satellite-delivered programming. Soon, uncut recent
movies, cultural programs, 24-hour news services, live coverage
of Congress, sports channels, and other special programming
quickly became available over cable only, and the medium began
to grow. This phase of cable television's history, and the impact
of satellite technology, is set forth in some detail in the Boulder
trial court's first opinion. Ie
These emergency programming services represented an advancing use of existing cable capacity, and did not involve any
greater intrusion on the public rights-of-way than that which existed previously. The new services being provided by cablecasters also rendered many older "CATV" decisions (pre-satellite,
pre-1977 decisions) inapposite to modern cablecasting issues. It
is now recognized that cable television is no longer properly referred to as "CATV". Cable television is a first amendment
speaker which provides neither common carrier nor Bome form
of essential public utility service; in effect, cable television is an
"electronic newspaper" which must make editorial decisions regarding such matters as program timing, selection, format, and
marketing. 17

D. The Emergence of a Medium: The "RFP" Clashes with
New Realities and New Legal Challenges
After 1976, cable television's new-found ability to enter ur16. Boulder I, 485 F. Supp. at 1036·37.
17. See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 46 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 829 (1977).
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ban markets naturally led to efforts to develop those markets. It
was generally assumed that a given market could only be developed if the city in question first agreed to a franchise contract. IS
After 1976, the larger cities were acutely aware of this new interest in their markets, and formal Requests for Proposals (RFP)
procedures were soon adopted by many of these cities for the
purpose of receiving and comparing cable television proposals. Ie
It is no secret that the cable television RFP process became controversial by the late 1970s, as the demands which cities made
on cable television companies multiplied. 20 The RFP process was
made more controversial because it was calculated to award an
entire undeveloped market to the single company which would
offer the city the most. 21 As a result, cable television companies
had little choice but to constantly increase their offers in an attempt to out-bid one another.
Soon smaller communities with existing cable television systems, such as Boulder, Colorado, began to envy what larger cities had exacted from cable television companies. They thus
adopted RFPs of their own in order to do such things as "extract some additional concessions"u from companies with existing contracts, or: replace companies with another which would
offer more. 2S
18. The word franchise is actually no longer appropriate in the cable television context, if it ever W88. The word "franchise" connotes a "special privilege" for monopoly,
utility-type service. See, e.g., 12 E. McQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §
34.01, at 7 (3d ed. 1970). Cable television is not a utility, Television Transmission, supra
note 7, and exclusive contracts have been held illegal in most states. See, e.g., TM
Cablevision v. Daon Corp., No. 15067 (San Diego Super. Ct., Jan. 22, 1981), reprinted in
6 MEDIA LAW REP. (BNA) 2576, 2578 (1981).
19. The RFP mode was presumably borrowed from procedures used by cities to collect bids for such things 88 new city buildings, vehicle procurement, etc. The "RFP" W88
thus inappropriate in the cable television context, which involve authorizations to engage
in a first amendment business rather than city purchases. Still, the RFP mode W88
adopted when urban markets developed.
20. See, e.g., J. Marks, Outrageous! How Franchise Documents Have Escalated!,
TVC MAGAZINE 48 (August 15, 1982) ("cost is getting too great-and too much [is demanded] in non-productive 88sets-incredible excess in channel capacity, community
studios, extra institutional networks and civil giveways. "). One commentator has called
franchising ordinances "big sticks" on the apparent theory that they can be used by local
governments to exact concessions from cablecasters and "evade" certain federal and
state laws. See W. Marticorena, The Cable Television Franchising Ordinance-The
City's "Big Stick" 25 (article submitted to California League of Cities in 1981).
21. See, e.g., Boulder II, 630 F.2d at 709-20 (Markey, C.J., dissenting).
22. Boulder III, 496 F. Supp. 823, 827 (D. Colo. 1980).
23. The RFP process is such that the Boulder trial court felt it appropriate to com-
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The Boulder case involved a 1979 RFP, and presents a microcosm of many of the issues involved in subsequent cable television cases. Before 1978, a cablecaster in Boulder, Community
Communications Company (CCC), had provided service to the
poor reception areas of the City pursuant to a non-exclusive permit. 24 In 1978, CCC started plans to develop the rest of the City
and bring in satellite delivered programming. In early 1979, CCC
advised the City of these plans, and the City's initial response
was enthusiastic.
In mid-1979, another cable television company advised the
City of Boulder that it too would like a non-exclusive permit to
compete with CCC. CCC did not oppose such competitive proposals but instead recognized that competition was possible and
could not be prevented by law. 21i Nonetheless, the City decided
to adopt an RFP containing numerous demands for additional
city control and proprietary benefits which could not be obtained through the police power. 26 When CCC declined to abandon its contract and refused to accept the RFP process, the City
unilaterally revoked the company's contract, and imposed a new
contract which contained a moratorium on development work
which CCC had already started. The moratorium was concededly for the purpose of allowing the City of Boulder to complete
its RFP selection process.
CCC did not view the moratorium as valid, and thus filed
suit in federal court alleging, inter alia, antitrust and first
amendment claims. The City of Boulder had two primary contentions in response to CCC's antitrust claims: (1) that it is exempt from liability under the antitrust laws; and (2) that even if
the City cannot invoke state action immunity, its attempts to
ment at one point: "Stated bluntly, may the City exact tribute for its favor?" Boulder I,
485 F. Supp. at 1040.
24. The facts of the Boulder case are set forth in considerable detail in Boulder I,
Boulder II, and Boulder III. Until the advent 'of satellite-delivered programming, it was
not economicaly feasible to serve the good-reception areas of Boulder.
25. Boulder III, 496 F. Supp. at 830.
26. The City had adopted a contract approach "[aJpparently upon the view that any
lack of regulatory authority could be finessed by the use of a contract approach . . . ."
Boulder I, 485 F. Supp. at 1037. Chief Judge Markey described the contract embodied
within Boulder's RFP to be a "total-control" contract, 630 F.2d at 719, but later RFPs
are even more demanding, involving many more pages of requirements than just the 22
pages involved in Boulder. See, e.g., G. SHAPIRO, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CATV 1981
245-335 (P.L.!. Series, 1981).
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control the cable television market are lawful because cable television is a "natural monopoly." The City also contended that:
(3) cable television, as a "natural monopoly," involves the type
of "scarcity" that justifies controls similar to those imposed on
broadcasters by the FCC; and (4) no first amendment issues are
present if the City does not dictate or interfere with the content
of CCC's programming. These last two contentions were made in
response to the first amendment claims in the Boulder case.
Each of the City's four contentions is flawed, as the record
of the Boulder case shows. However, variations of each of these
four contentions continue to be vigorously asserted by local governments. It is thus appropriate to examine each position
separately.

E. Conventional Antitrust and First Amendment Principles
Do Apply To Modern Cable Television
1.

There is No Municipal Immunity

In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,17 the
Supreme Court made it clear that local governments have no antitrust immunity of their own. Of course, municipalities can
cloak themselves with the states' exemption when they implement an affirmatively expressed, clearly articulated and supervised state policy to replace competition in a relevant market
with some form of monopoly regulation dictated by the state.1I8
In all other cases, though, cities "must obey the antitrust
laws."19
In the Boulder case, the City argued that it was specifically
authorized by the Colorado Home Rule provisions under which
it operated to regulate the use of its streets and issue franchises.
It thus argued that the State of Colorado must have contemplated that Boulder might adopt a cable television RFP and
award the market to only one company. From this argument the
City concluded that it was entitled to state action immunity
under the rationale of City of Lafayette.
As the Supreme Court pointed out, such an argument to27. 435 U.S. 389, 410-13 (1978).
28. Id. at 410-13.
29. Id. at 416.
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tally misconceives what the High Court means when it says that
a clearly articulated, affirmatively expressed, and actively supervised state policy is required before a city can avail itself of the
state's exemption from federal antitrust laws. Not any affirmative state policy will do; the affirmative state policy must actually replace competition in a given market with some form of
comprehensive, monopoly regulatory mode which the state has
outlined or fashioned. 30 As the Boulder Court noted, a general
state authorization can never suffice. 31
In other words, if state law appears indifferent as to
whether or not competition is displaced in a given market, there
can be no antitrust immunity. As one commentator has stated,
"the possibility that two cities could adopt opposite policies consistent with the same state authorization dooms the claims for
immunity under Boulder."32 Were the rule otherwise, cities
could "make economic choices counseled solely by their own parochial interests and without regard to their anticompetitive effects,"33 and this is exactly what Boulder and City of Lafayette
forbid.
With regard to cable television, some cities have argued that
Boulder does not apply in states such as California, which have
a statute authorizing cities to enter into contracts with cable television companies." However, such statutes are nothing more
than general authorizations to enter into almost any type of contractual arrangement imaginable, or not to enter into such contracts, as each city wishes. Such state neutrality on the subject
falls short of a clear, affirmatively expressed state policy to displace competition in the cable television market, and even
before Boulder, district courts in the Ninth Circuit so ruled. 311
30. [d. at 413; Ronwin v. State Bar of Arizona, 686 F.2d 692, 697 (9th Cir. 1981);
Corey v. Look, 641 F.2d 32, 36 (1st Cir. 1981).
31. Boulder V, 455 U.S. at 54-56.
32. Municipal Antitrust Liability, Prospects After the Boulder Case, FED. CITY
RPTR. at 6 (February 5, 1982).
33. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 408.
34. California has such a provision in its government code. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §
53066 (West 1982).
35. See, e.g., Televants, Inc. v. City of Martinez, No. C 81-2376 TEH (N.D. Cal.,
Oct. 23, 1981) (Order denying defendants' Motion to Dismiss because "neither the papers nor the oral arguments of defendants establish that California Government Code §§
53066 and 53066.1 clearly articulate a state policy to displace competition in cable television." [d. at 2); LibertY,Communications, Inc. v. Washington County, Civ. No. SO-471-PA
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Since attempts by municipal leagues to have the California Legislature adopt legislation replacing competition with a state plan
for monopoly regulation of cable television have failed, it is all
the more clear that Boulder-type immunity arguments must fail
in states like California. 86
It is also self-evident that Boulder requires a valid state
policy before any state action immunity can arise. 87 This recognizes that there are constitutional limits on exercises of state police power. For example, any state (or even congressional) policy
to displace competition among first amendment disseminators
would violate the first amendment, and thus be invalid, no matter how clearly articulated, affirmatively expressed or actively
supervised. 88
2. Cable Television is Not a "Natural Monopoly"

The City of Boulder also argued strenuously that cable television is a natural monopoly. Therefore-even though it was
clearly preventing competition-the city contended that its attempts to control a natural monopoly were lawful.
The natural monopoly assertion is, of course, an assertion of
fact, to which Chief Judge Markey responded:
On appeal, the city's sole defense is to pretend,
disingenuously and contrary to the extensive, uncontradicted testimony and the specific findings
of the trial judge, and contrary to its own City At(D. Ore., Sept. 23, 1980) (Consent Decree and Final Judgment entered after preliminary
injunction issued against county).
36. The California Legislature did introduce a bill, AB 3130, with the view that it
might be adequate to confer antitrust immunity, but AB 3130 was not enacted. At hearings on AB 3130 though, the City Attorney for the City of Torrance, representing the
League of California Cities and the "view of really all city attorneys who have studied
cable television," testified correctly "that Section 53066 of the Government Code is inadequate" to confer antitrust immunity because "it is neutral" and "not a clearly articulated, affirmatively expressed state policy as it now exists." Special Joint Hearing of
Subcommittee on Cable Television and Assembly, Local Government Committee, Local
Government Franchising and Regulation of Cable TV in California after Boulder and
AB 3130, 1982 Spec. Sess. 49-50 (1982) (statement of Stanley Remelmeyer, City Attorney
for the City of Torrance, California).
37. See Brief for Petitioner at 35 n.19, Community Communications Co. v. City of
Boulder, 445 U.S. 40 (1982).
38. See, e.g., Transcript of Special Joint Hearing of Subcommittee on Cable Television and Assembly Local Government Committee, supra note 36, at 29-32.
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torney's advice, that cable is a "natural monopoly." The city's sole argument in this case is that
because there can be only one cable operator in
Boulder, the moratorium was necessary to prevent CCC from "wiring the entire city" before the
city could conduct its bid process and select what
it considered the "best" company to enjoy that
monopoly. Not to put too fine a point on it, that
argument is today simply fallacious. As the trial
judge found, and as the record makes clear, modern technology makes free and open competition
both practically and economically available to the
city by at least four competing cable
communicators.88

Moreover, cable television is increasingly subject to vigorous
competition from other suppliers of video news, information,
and entertainment, none of whom are burdened by the demands
which cities are now making of cable television. 40
More importantly, the "thin market" argument is flawed
from a legal standpoint. 41 First, since cable television is not a
utility, those courts which discuss the natural monopoly concept
as if cable television was a utility have failed to recognize the
true nature of this emerging member of the media.42 Second, in
39. Boulder II, 630 F.2d at 712.
40. STV (coded UHF signal pay TV), MDS (microwave distributed pay TV), DBS
(Direct Broadcast Satellite pay TV), master antenna system, SMATV (satellite), video
cassettes and video disks constitute just some of the competing services now available.
See, e.g., Fielding Competition: Beware of the Growing List of Competition, CABLEVISION 23 (May 17, 1982).
41. It is preferable to use the less pejorative phrase "thin market" to describe the
so-called "natural monopoly" situation. See L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST § 45, at 115 (1977).
42. A recent Seventh Circuit case illustrates this point. See Omega Satellite Prod. v.
City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119 (7th Cir. 1982). Although dealing with a satellite pay
service which "compete[s) with cable television systems" rather than cable television itself," id. at 121, the court considered the natural monopoly defense in dictum because
Omega had applied for a permit to make some use of the public ways. After reviewing
principles of "public utility franchising," plus various gas, telephone and other utility
and common carrier cases, the Omega court speculated that a natural monopoly argument might justify some form of government control over such a market, although the
scope such controls could lawfully assume can only be determined on a case-by-case basis after factual findings at trial. [d. at 125-27. However, once it is more widely recognized that cable television is a member of the media and not a utility, it is doubtful that
courts will adopt the Omega rationale. See, e.g., Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of
New England, Inc., 284 F.2d 582, 584 (1st Cir. 1960) (in non-utility context, competitive
market forces must be allowed to operate).
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non-utility contexts, the natural monopoly cases have never
stood for the proposition that, outside the utility or common
carrier context, government can predetermine whether a market
is a thin market, or select who the one supplier will be in a thin
market. 43 This is particularly true when first amendment businesses are involved. 44 It thus appears that municipalities have no
viable defense to section 1 and section 2 Sherman Act claims,
especially when contractual relationships are involved, which automatically satisfies section l's two-actor requirement. 46

3. Novel First Amendment Issues and Misconceptions
About "Scarcity"
Once cable television's first amendment character is acknowledged, it is quite apparent that first amendment issues are
raised by any procedure which excludes one member of the media from a market in order to give the market to another com~
pany that would pay the city more. In the Boulder case, the City
responded to these concerns by adopting a position which was
an extension of its natural monopoly argument.
In essence, Boulder argued that there are two types of media: over-the-air broadcasters and print media. 46 It was also as43. As the cablecaster in the Boulder case argued to the Supreme Court, "The City
essentially argues that it should be allowed to determine in advance that a market is a
thin market, and then should be allowed to designate the monopolist. Both actions
would be illegal under the antitrust laws. Whether a thin market exists can only be determined by the free play of competitive forces. See, e.g., Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 284 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1960). Even if a municipal predetermination of thin market status was not illegal, the City still could not designate a
monopolist. The antitrust laws require that an 'elimination bout' determine who the supplier shall be in a thin market, which cable television is not. ld. at 584 n.4." Brief for
petitioner at 13 n.4, Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 445 U.S. 40
(1982). In the utility context, of course, states have often displaced competition with
monopoly regulation, but in exchange have also guaranteed the utilities a reasonable rate
of return on their investments-a guarantee which is not extended by regulation to the
non-utility business of cable television. See, e.g., Orange County Cable Communications
Co. v. City of San Clemente, 59 Cal. App. 3d 165, 130 Cal. Rptr. 429 (1976).
44. See, e.g., Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 284 F.2d at
584; Omega Satellite Prod. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d at 128 "([it] should be noted
that while today most newspaper markets are natural monopolies, no one thinks that
entry into those markets could be regulated without creating profound First Amendment
problems").
45. See Boulder I, 485 F. Supp. at 1039, citing Perma-Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968); Boulder ll, 630 F.2d at 714-15.
46. See Brief for Appellant, at 31-50, Community Communications Co., Inc. v. City
of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1981).
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serted that different first amendment standards apply to each. 4?
The City then argued that cable television was more like broadcasting than the print media because both broadcasters and
cable television involve scarcity situations. The City thus concluded that it could lawfully control cable television in all the
ways the FCC can control broadcasters.
The City's position seriously misconstrues what is meant by
the term "scarcity" in the broadcast context. It is true that the
electromagnetic spectrum is limited and that no two broadcasters can occupy the same space on the spectrum and transmit
properly. This physical scarcity limitation justifies a system
whereby the FCC allocates licenses to broadcasters.48 However,
all courts apparently agree that this physical scarcity problem
does not exist with regard to cable television, which uses discrete
cables rather than the air waves. 49 As the District of Columbia
Circuit noted: "The First Amendment theory espoused in [the
broadcasting cases] . . . cannot be directly applied to cable television since an essential precondition of that theory-physical
interference and scarcity requiring an umpiring role for government-is absent."lIo Some have argued that economic scarcity
(i.e., the possibility that a market can support only one supplier)
should also justify government intervention and control of first
amendment disseminators, but this argument has been expressly
rejected with regard to both the print media and cable
television. III
In the Boulder case, however, the Tenth Circuit coined the
47. The City, however, failed to recognize that, even though "[e]ach method [of
communication] tends to present its own peculiar problems ... the basic principles of
freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment's command, do not vary.
Those principles, as they have frequently been enunciated by this Court, make freedom
of expression the rule." Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952).
48. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101
(1973).
49. See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 44-45 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); Boulder II, 630 F.2d at 713.
50. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d at 44-45.
51. "[S]carcity which is the result solely of economic conditions is apparently insufficient to justify even limited government intrusion into the First Amendment rights of
the conventional press, . . . and there is nothing in the record before us to suggest a
constitutional distinction between cable television and newspapers on this point." Home
Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d at 46, citing Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,
418 U.S. 241, 247-56 (1974).
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phrase "media scarcity" to describe a situation analogous to economic scarcity.1I2 The Tenth Circuit then speculated that, if media scarcity existed in a community, the local government might
be justified in selecting the one member of the media it deemed
"best." As a legal proposition, the Tenth Circuit's media scarcity
rationale is indistinguishable from earlier economic scarcity arguments, is thus untenable, and has been criticized by commentators. liS Moreover, upon remand for findings of fact, the Boulder trial court approved stipulated findings of fact which are
directly contrary to the factual suppositions the Tenth Circuit
adopted in support of its media scarcity rationale.1I4
52. Boulder IV, 660 F.2d at 1378.
53. See, e.g., Note, Access to Cable Television: A Critique of the Affirmative Duty
Theory of the First Amendment, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1393, 1406-07 (1982). See also an
exhaustive article by Professor William Lee, entitled Cable Franchising and the First
Amendment, which will appear in a 1983 edition of VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW. It is possible that the Tenth Circuit's position would conflict with the Supreme Court's recent
admonition that "differential treatment" of first amendment disseminators presumptively violates the first amendment. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota
Comm'r of Revenue, 51 U.S.L.W. 4315 (U.S. Mar. 29, 1983) (No. 81-1839). Most cable
television RFP's and contracts treat cablecasters differentially and do not seek the least
restrictive means of achieving any legitimate, compelling governmental interest which
may exist.
54. On October 29, 1982, a stipulation and final judgment was approved and filed by
the trial court. The trial court expressly found that the following stipulations of fact
were supported by the evidence presented during several days of hearings on the two
preliminary injunctions which had been entered in the case:
[Finding No.3) CCC is a cable television company, and is thus
a publisher of news, information and entertainment which it
sometimes originates, and also selects or obtains from a variety of sources. Material published by CCC shall not be considered commercial speech. Although CCC may, incident to its
dissemination activities, publish some advertising, CCC's predominant activity is the publication of protected, noncommercial speech.
[Finding No.4) The cable television medium differs greatly
from the broadcast medium. The physical scarcity problems
associated with wireless use of the electromagnetic broadcast
spectrum do not exist in connection with cable television, thus
removing, as a practical matter, technological limitations on
the number of cablecasters that can co-exist in the City.
[Finding No.5) CCC is a First Amendment disseminator, and
not a broadcaster, and is entitled to the protections of the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
[Finding No.6) Competition among more than one cablecaster
in the City is economically possible.
Community Communications Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, Civ. Action No. 8O-M-62, 5-6
(D. Colo. Oct. 29, 1982) (Stipulation and Judgment).
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It is thus apparent that governmental attempts to control
cable television should be judged by the established first amendment standards which apply to all other non-broadcast members
of the media.
4. Content-Based Regulation is Not Lawful

One last area of confusion deserves mention. In Boulder, the
cable caster contended that the City's actions had been based on
considerations related to the content of the cablecaster's dissemination, and thus ran afoul of the absolute prohibition on content-based restrictions. 1III In response, the City stated that, since
it was not dictating the actual content of programming, its actions were not content-based.
The City's position misunderstands the scope of the term
"content" in the first amendment context. In addition to the
substantive message being conveyed, the "content" of first
amendment activity includes such things as the "form" of expressionjlls any "layout" or format involved jll7 the "size" or
amount of space devoted to expressionjll8 the number of channels provided,1I9 and so forth. Thus, any selection process which
is based on a comparison of such "content," or dictates standards regarding such "content" (as all cable television RFPs do),
is content-based. so
This would be true even if the first amendment disseminator is "not prevented . . . from saying anything it wishes. "SI
Choices are still being made on the basis of content, selections
are being made on the basis of the identity of the speakers and
what they propose to disseminate, and content is being influ55. Use of the word "restriction" rather than "regulation" is intentional. Cable television cases such as Boulder typically involve restrictions imposed by contract-ordinances which must be accepted in writing, rather than any form of police power regulation. See, e.g., Boulder II, 630 F.2d at 714-15.
56. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
57. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 391
(1973).
58. See, e.g., Miami Herald, 418 U.S. at 257-58 & n.22.
59. See, e.g., Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d at 1056.
60. See, e.g., Midwest Video, 571 F.2d at 1053 (mandatory "public access" channel
rules were content-based even though the substantive message was not regulated);
Miami Herald, 418 U.S. at 253-58.
61. Miami Herald, 418 U.S. at 256.
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enced as a result. Since any government-imposed restriction
which is content-based violates the first amendment,62 the RFP
procedures now being pursued by some cities raise serious first
amendment concerns. 68
CONCLUSION

Cable television is a somewhat misunderstood medium. As
the federal courts continue to deal with important questions related to cable television, it will be increasingly necessary to explore such factual issues as the nature of the medium, the nature
of the relevant market, and the effects of various mandatory
contractual controls which local governments have proposed.84
Such inquiries, it can be hoped, will facilitate both a better understanding of the media, and a wider application of legal standards which have been long-accepted in other contexts.

62. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. Public Services Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530,
536-38 (1980). The Tenth Circuit in the Boulder case agreed that, where such contentbased restrictions develop, "a significant First Amendment isaue" is presented. 660 F.2d
at 1377 n.6.
63. Local government may sincerely feel that it would never use control of cable
television to control the measage being disseminated, but in reality government control
of the media leads inevitably to control of the measage. For example, some cable television companies are now hiring their own investigative reporters and camera crews, and
covering local news. However, when one city manager heard of such a proposal, his reaction was as follows:
"I'm not sure if I'd have minicameras running around interviewing people on the street .... They can ask their neighbor if they want to know what they think . . . . What I'm
talking about is quality programming. . . with good direction
and control .... [S)ome guy giving you his opinion about a
war, [or) what a local City Councilman does with a cameraman
sticking a camera in his face ... that is not of interest ....n
Transcript of Contra Costa County Cable Television Hearings, at 20, line 21 to p. 21, line
16 (February 10, 1982, Contra Costa County, California). With this degree of concern
over the content and "quality" of programming, and with the apparent reluctance to
have city officials exposed to a probing local news media, one must ask whether government influences over the mesaage can be far behind?
64. Cities often ask courts to asaume these disputed factual isaues can be resolved in
a way that supports the RFP procesa, and thus move for a dismisaal of cablecasters
complaints under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Federal courts
have correctly recognized that such dismisaala are inappropriate. See, e.g., Televents,
Inc. v. City of Martinez, supra note 35.
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